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Abstract
The prominent 18th century empirical philosopher George Berkeley espoused a
philosophy known as “idealism.” This thesis aims to show that George Berkeley’s idealism is a
formidable player in philosophy of mind. The present research unfolds his arguments for
idealism as they appear in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, turning at
several points to The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous for clarification. This
research further explores the fundamentals of idealism in light of philosophy of mind,
highlighting idealism’s intrinsic connection to this discipline. While this work is far from
exhaustive, it provides the reader with essential information on Berkeley’s idealism and proves
its worth as a philosophy in today’s world.
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INTRODUCTION
General Intro – Berkeley the Gadfly
What does the philosopher do? Most professions are easy to pin down. If I say,
“musician,” we are talking of someone that plays music. If I say, “sculptor,” we are talking of
someone that sculpts. The English language is so exacting in this regard that we even have
“arkwrights” – people that earn a living making wooden chests. Yet, if I say, “philosopher,”
hardly anyone comes to a decisive definition. Some have tried – the Merriam Webster dictionary
offers that a philosopher is “a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment.”1 Even this effort
begs the question. For starters, what is wisdom? What is enlightenment? What is it to seek them?
I submit that the work of a philosopher does not define easily precisely because it relies on
whom it describes for its features.
In George Berkeley’s case, we find an archaic sort of philosopher on display, in the sense
that the archetypally first philosopher called himself by a name that suits Berkeley very well. In
Plato’s Apology, Socrates famously calls himself the “gadfly of Athens” – a gadfly literally being
“any of various flies, as a stable fly or warble fly, that bite or annoy domestic animals.”2
Reflecting Socrates’ discourse, the dictionary carries a second definition of the term: “a person
who persistently annoys or provokes others with criticism, schemes, ideas, demands, requests,
etc.”3 Contrary to the image of a stodgy school don in a robe, smoking a pipe in the corner, and
generally looking like Gandalf on homestay, Berkeley actively engages with the thinkers of his
own time. In fact, he is so good at engaging with his contemporaries that Berkeley’s philosophy
lives in many cases primarily as a critique of his colleagues or predecessors.
1

“Philosopher,” Merriam Webster Dictionary, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/philosopher.
2
“Gadfly,” Dictionary.com, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/gadfly?s=t.
3
“Gadfly,” Dictionary.com.
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To pick a name that everyone knows, Berkeley criticizes Isaac Newton’s Principia, a
book which, at the time, was in vogue among philosophers. Leaving out the particulars, notice
the way that Berkeley introduces what he has to say about Newton: “…which distinction, as it is
at large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the
mind: and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which
nevertheless in their own nature, they bear no relation at all.”4 Berkeley’s Socratic roots show in
his tactic with Newton. Berkeley’s critiques of contemporary and past philosophy are
thoroughgoing and fascinating. Here I propose to consider George Berkeley the great gadfly of
18th century philosophy.5
Berkeley’s primary texts are famously quite short. The Penguin Classics edition of A
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge lasts a mere seventy-six pages.6 The
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous likewise endures only eighty-seven pages.7 It is
my contention that idealism went out of style rather than was defeated; I believe that Berkeley’s
idealism is a viable contender in the contemporary world of philosophy. In his book Mind, John
Searle notes: “Idealism had a prodigious influence in philosophy, literally for centuries, but as far
as I can tell it has been dead as a doornail among nearly all of the philosophers whose opinions I

4

George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in Berkeley: Philosophical Writings,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Introduction ¶110. As we will see, one of Berkeley’s central tenets
is that there are no objects or forces existing without the mind (or a mind, or a couple of minds… the intricacies of
this view will be addressed later).
5
See David Berman, “Berkeley’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Philosophy to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-33 for an examination of scholarship on Berkeley’s life and
works. His personal intellectual development is worth the read.
6
George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in George Berkeley: Principles of
Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin
Books, 1988), 31-113.
7
George Berkeley, The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in George Berkeley: Principles of Human
Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin Books,
1988), 115-208.
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respect, for many decades, so I will not say much about it.”8 In contrast to Searle, I think
idealism more than holds its own in today’s intellectual space; the challenge is bringing the
reader up to speed.
Thesis Statement
Here is my ultimate thesis: to show that idealism, when thoroughly investigated, remains
a strong philosophical player, especially in philosophy of mind and self.9 In order to prove this, I
will house the discussion primarily within (what is to me) his most important text, A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. I will investigate three selections of this work:
the Introduction to the Principles, “Against the Existence of Matter,” and “Spirits and
Epistemology.”10 Where necessary, I will make recourse to his work in the Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous, another of his principal writings. In discussing the Introduction to
the Principles and “Against the Existence of Matter,” I will lay the foundations of idealist
metaphysics. Beginning with “Spirits and Epistemology,” I will turn towards the claim that
Berkeley’s idealism is a strong philosophical contender by speaking to its capabilities as a
philosophy of mind and self. Ultimately, I will conclude in a cursory section on philosophy of
mind that Berkeleyan idealism is far from dead – it as strong or stronger a contender than its
chief competitors in the field.

8

John Searle, Mind: a brief introduction (Fundamentals of Philosophy Series), (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004), 47-48.
9
I unfortunately do not have space to adequately address each party within the philosophy of mind to show that
idealism holds its own in each case. I have chosen to show idealism’s superiority over Cartesian dualism because
each prominent philosophy of mind today can do this (or at least attempts to) – I hope that in showing idealism’s
similar ability, it will be manifest to the reader that, although not presently demonstrated, it is reasonable to claim
that idealism is yet a lively, active contender in philosophy of mind.
10
“Against the Existence of Matter” and “Spirits and Epistemology” are names of my own invention. I will clarify
their proper purview under the heading “Discussion of the Main Text of the Principles.”
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A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
Introductory notes on the Introduction to the Principles
In the introduction to The Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley makes a fascinating
case concerning the difficulty and confusion that often surrounds philosophical discourse.
According to my reading of the introduction, Berkeley makes twenty-five individual points.
Some of these points are his general observations and others are substantive to his underlying
argument. The references given throughout this section refer to the paragraph number in
question.11 Where I have placed a letter next to the paragraph number (such as “¶2a”), this is to
indicate which part of the paragraph I am referring to. Assume that I am referencing the
introduction unless I state otherwise. Concerning the text itself, Berkeley starts us off in a very
philosophically honest place with the observation that as soon as reasoning starts, scruples
appear.12, 13
Scruples and Berkeley’s take on them
From the outset of any philosophical discussion, scruples are cropping up left and right.
In today’s context, we hear it often in the classroom: Aristotle sees it this way, Hume sees it this
way, and Locke sees it yet another way… scruples are omnipresent in philosophical discourse.

11

Some authors (see, for example: Kenneth Winkler Berkeley and the Doctrine of Signs, in “Berkeley: Philosophical
Writings” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 126.) use the word “section” in place of paragraph when
speaking of Berkeley. I have chosen paragraphs to allow use of the paragraph symbol (¶).
12
Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶1.
13
This is Berkeley’s chosen word for disagreements, contentions, and generally not seeing something the same
way as another. Fair warning: I am about to use the word scruples an annoying amount. Avoiding synonyms allows
me to stay true to the wording in the paragraphs where he addresses the present subject.
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Berkeley makes note of several common interpretations of the omnipresence of scruples. Some
say that scruples are due to weakness of human minds; we just are not capable of seeing clearly
enough to get beyond our scruples.14 Similarly, scruples could be the result of human finitude;
we are relatively small beings, so we miss out on the grander elements in the reality of the
world.15 Or yet, scruples could be the result of the misuse of our faculties rather than the
incapacity of our faculties.16 For Berkeley, this third option (that scruples are the result of the
misuse of our faculties) holds water.17
In fact, not only does the third option hold water, Berkeley casts with it a very promising
vision of human intellectual ability. We are capable of much better than these scruples, Berkeley
says.18 To unravel our scruples, we need only find the head scruple-causer and eliminate it: for
Berkeley, this is “the opinion that the mind has a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of
things.”19 Berkeley’s primary evidence against the claim to the power of abstraction is that, in a
word, you are always imagining something specific; or, what is the same thing, you are never
imagining something abstract.20, 21 As Robert Fogelin puts it, Berkeley “is not simply arguing
that we do not possess this or that particular abstract idea; his claim is generic. According to him,
it is not in our power to form any abstract ideas whatsoever.”22

14

Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶2a.
Berkeley, ¶2b.
16
Berkeley, ¶3a.
17
Berkeley, ¶3b.
18
Berkeley, ¶4.
19
Berkeley, ¶6.
20
Berkeley, ¶10.
21
This claim (that you are always imagining something specific) is known as “particularism.” Berkeley, as will be
shown momentarily, is quite a stringent particularist.
22
Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 108.
15
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Abstract ideas and Berkeley’s take on them
Now, this claim that the mind cannot form abstract ideas lacks a certain sort of colloquial
sense. When I am in class and my teacher wants me to focus on the broader concept at play, she
says to me, “think of this in the abstract.” Or, I will be in conversation and as a clarification will
say that I am speaking abstractly, not just of this or that. The word abstract has a very welcome
home in the English language – so, in what manner is Berkeley saying that we do not have the
power of abstraction?
Berkeley has a simple way of explaining himself. He has no desire to rid us of the
common-sense notion that we can speak generally instead of specifically. His solution to the
stated question is simple: general ideas exist, abstract ideas do not.23 Fogelin explains that by this
point, it is clear that “Berkeley is thus faced with two tasks: the first, to produce decisive reasons
for rejecting the doctrine of abstract ideas, the second, to give a satisfactory account of general
terms in place of the abstractionist account.”24 Berkeley’s tactic is to prove that abstract ideas do
nothing that general ideas do not; and, because (as will be shown) general ideas do not need
abstraction to be explained, there is no reason to posit the existence of abstract ideas.
One must distinguish at this point between the colloquial use of the word “abstract” and
philosophical use of the word. Berkeley describes abstraction’s philosophical use in some length,
and I think it is worthwhile to see the full selection. Here is the passage:
“It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each
of them apart by it self and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and
blended together, several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to
consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is
united, does by that means frame to it self abstract ideas… Not that it is possible for
colour or motion to exist without extension, but only that the mind can frame to it self by

23
24

Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶12.
Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109.
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abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both
colour and extension.”25
Abstraction, in the philosophical sense, is not simply generalizing to talk about qualities
that two or more entities share, although this is one important facet of it. Abstraction is also the
ability to consider a single quality of a single entity exclusive of the entity’s other qualities. So,
in the last sentence of the quotation, we see that “the mind can frame to it self by abstraction the
idea of colour exclusive of extension,” etcetera. The abstractionist account of general terms is
that if, for example, I saw an apple, I could abstract the apple’s redness and plug that redness
back in when I notice that the cap on the bottle of Jamison whiskey is also red. Thus, in the
abstractionist account, we come by general terms: pluck one quality out of the set of qualities
composing one object and pluck the same (or a very similar) quality out of the set composing
some other object. This gives us a “redness” which is not tied to any particular instantiation of
the color red. Fogelin speaks of this as the ability to “abstract a ‘determinable’ distinct from any
of its specific determinations.”26 He continues, “For example, presented with a variety of
differing figures and magnitudes, the mind is supposed to be able to abstract a notion of
something common to all, namely, extension.”27 By this process, we are able to speak generally
of redness (and the same for all other qualities). The final way to abstract is that of “complex or
compounded ideas” (Berkeley’s term). Fogelin simply quotes Berkeley’s explanation, and I will
follow suit:
“For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other,
in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or
compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is
peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and so makes an abstract idea
wherein the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those
circumstances and differences, which might determine it to any particular existence.”28
25

Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶7.
Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109.
27
Fogelin, 109.
28
Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶9
26
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To make a brief resume of Berkeley’s take on abstraction, we have three manners of
abstraction: the ability to frame qualities exclusive of those with which they are presented to us
(“the mind frames to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension…”), the
ability to abstract to speak of general terms, and the ability to simplify a complex idea down to
only those qualities shared equally by each similar complex idea. Recall from Fogelin that
Berkeley has two jobs: to show that abstraction is false and to give a satisfactory account of
general terms.29 The stage is set for Berkeley’s answer – which answer comes as a jumbled
response to both of these tasks.
Berkeley’s position is that mind is constantly moving to generalize and organize
experiences but is engaged in so doing such that it neither abstracts a single quality exclusive of
others, nor abstracts a single quality in order to speak generally, nor simplifies complex ideas to
gain only the equally shared qualities. How so? As previously noted from ¶10, Berkeley endorses
what is called “particularism,” or the theory of perception which says that no matter how hard
you try to conceive of a single quality at a time, you must be conceiving of a single quality of a
single entity.30 You can get particular, you can get specific, you can think with clarity about one
certain aspect… of a certain thing. Here is the clincher: if that certain aspect is tied to that certain
thing, it is always really a quality as it relates to the other qualities of the entity.
Try it for yourself, says Berkeley: can you picture extension without thinking of
something extended? Can you picture color without thinking of something colored? Can you
picture motion without thinking of something moving? Of course not.31 Abstracts lack
explanatory power; or, to put that in a more Berkeleyan way, abstracts exist only to cause

29

Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109.
Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶10.
31
Berkeley, ¶14.
30
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scruples. As Fields notes, “The cause [of scruples] is not ‘the obscurity of things, or the natural
weakness and imperfection our understanding’ ( PHKI 2), as Locke would have us believe, but
rather abuse of language stemming from ‘the opinion that the mind hath a of framing abstract
ideas or notions of things’ ( PHKI 6).”32 In short, if we want to move beyond mere philosophical
bickering and scruples, we must lose the chief scruple-causer: the opinion that the mind has the
power of framing to itself abstract ideas.
Root of the error that is abstract ideas
Now, Berkeley realizes that the power to form abstract ideas has a longstanding place in
philosophy. His immediate predecessor, John Locke, makes a great deal of the power of
abstraction, and so Berkeley is very often addressing himself against Locke. Nonetheless, it is
not Locke that invented abstracted ideas; arguably, abstracts date to ancient Greek philosophy
and well before. They are a common philosophical motif. This means that the burden of proof is
on Berkeley to show why such a staple of the philosophical diet should be gotten rid of. In other
words, how, if it is so false, did abstraction become so accepted? Answering this question gives
us yet more of Berkeley’s argument against abstract ideas themselves.
Berkeley pins the root of the error on the fact that language makes it seems as though
abstract ideas must exist.33 The first mistake that philosophers make is thinking that each name in
a language (chair, cat, car, guitar, lamp…) must have one unchanging, unaltering definition.34
Furthermore, we have assumed that this unchanging definition denotes one idea, and the same
idea, forever and without end. Keeping a single name (a noun) to a single definition (a group of
words describing the noun) is good, necessary, and perfectly feasible. Keeping a single name to a

32

Keota Fields, Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 100.
Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶18a.
34
Berkeley, ¶18b.
33
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single idea, however, is impossible.35 We have wrongly assumed that the only end of language is
the communication of ideas, and so we wrongly assume that every significant name must stand
for an idea.36, 37 Berkeley posits that the communication of ideas is not the only point of
language.38 Words often garner results without conjuring up an intermediary idea.39 This is
especially true (and obvious) in the case of familiar language.40
Take the phrase “How is it going?” for example. I am not asking whether you are literally
moving well, am I? I have not even defined the “it” that I am asking about, much less what I
mean by this verb “to go.” Nonetheless, this question garners immediate results. If I ask you how
it is going, you respond with, “well, my last exam was really difficult.” Or, “I love this cup of
coffee!” Or, as a direct answer to the question, “It is going well.” This question is so vague that
its purpose cannot possibly be to garner an intermediary idea with which I interact. This is
Berkeley’s point – especially in the case of familiar words and phrases, there is no conjuring of
ideas occurring in the mind.41 There is no power of abstraction active during the process of
communication; neither is it necessary to posit the power of abstraction to explain what is
happening when language is in use. We very often go straight from hearing to doing without
reflecting or inventing or considering (or, notably, abstracting) anything at all. Even when we do
“abstract” in the colloquial sense, we are really making general ideas; and general ideas are not
abstract ideas in the philosophical sense. Berkeley’s argument is that to posit the mind’s activity
as being “abstraction” is to mutilate and overcomplicate basic linguistic interactions, and that

35

Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶18c.
Berkeley, ¶19a.
37
Berkeley, ¶19b.
38
Berkeley, ¶20a.
39
Berkeley, ¶20b.
40
Berkeley, ¶20c.
41
Berkeley, ¶20.
36
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where generalization is necessary, we are not talking about something that fits the given
philosophical definition of an abstract idea anyhow.
Returning to the question at hand, how is it that abstraction became so widely accepted if
it is so evidently wrong? Berkeley maintains that language makes it appear that abstraction is
necessary by virtue of our keeping a single name to a single a definition on the assumption that
this definition marks out a single idea. Since one definition marking one idea is the would-be
starting point of abstraction, and since this is not possible, abstraction never gets off the ground.
Pretending that abstraction does get off the ground, abstraction still is not necessary to explain
language and communication. There are two elements of language at play: the bit where we talk
about general ideas and the bit where we go straight from word to action. We obviously do not
need abstraction to explain the words-to-action bit; and the philosophical definition of abstract
ideas does not fit the general ideas we employ in the other case. If we do not need the power of
abstraction to explain language, then all this talk about abstraction being the ability to do suchand-such a thing is both secondary to a mistake and not necessary. If what is secondary to a
mistake must be wrong, and if what is not necessary is not necessary, then the opinion that the
mind has power to form abstract ideas is out on all counts.
Berkeley’s action plan, now that we know the problem with philosophy
Fogelin summarizes that for Berkeley, “the commitment to abstract ideas has not only
been nonproductive, it has been an actual source of error. The root error, for Berkeley, is the
thought that we can form, through the power of abstraction, the idea of something existing that is
neither a perceiver nor a thing perceived.”42 Fields writes that “by placing his attack on abstract

42

Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley, 113.
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ideas in the introduction Berkeley intends to clear the reader’s mind of any lingering false
principles in preparation for the philosophical arguments presented in the main text.”43 The
question at this point is how we are to rid ourselves of the opinion that the mind has the power of
framing abstract ideas. Berkeley’s suggestion is that if the old names for things are confusing (if
our old philosophical terminology constantly makes us assume, like sliding into a rut on a dirt
road, the power of framing abstract ideas), we should switch up our names and start again from
top.44 The idea is that reworking our language, even given the difficulty of this project, is the
proper way of dealing with abstract ideas.45 The work of discerning agreements and
disagreements between one’s thoughts equals out to attentiveness to one’s own understanding.46
In other words, here is our solution: we know that we have given bad definitions for words in the
past. So, let us start with a new slate of words and pay sharp attention to our further use of these
words to make sure we do not contradict ourselves and invent new errors or reinvent old errors
by sliding back into the rut of abstract ideas.
Conclusion to discussion on the Introduction
Berkeley finishes his Introduction to A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge with an appeal to the reader. If the reader wants to understand what Berkeley is about
(namely, what follows in the main text of the Principles), then the reader must make himself
think the sorts of thoughts that Berkeley had to think in the way that Berkeley had to think them
for him to conclude that his idealism paints the right picture of our experiences.47 This appeal

43

Fields, Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence, 100.
Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶21.
45
Berkeley, ¶22a.
46
Berkeley, ¶22b.
47
For an interesting discussion of why Berkeley must be read so carefully, consider Fogelin’s treatment of the
simple term “idealism.” A.A. Luce, a premier Berkeley scholar, considers Berkeley an “immaterialist” instead of an
44
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makes good sense given Berkeley’s solution to the problem of thinking that the mind has the
power to frame abstract ideas. He is asking you not merely to think hard and do good
philosophy; he is asking you to first take the philosophy you already know and toss it to the side
such that you can start fresh with new terminology and from this point examine and explain the
world marked out by your experience.

“AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER”
Introductory notes on “Against the Existence of Matter”
In “Against the Existence of Matter,” Berkeley makes twenty-nine individual points. As
in the introduction to the Principles, some of Berkeley’s points make contributions to his overall
argument and some are more like observations or evidences to demonstrate his propositions. As
this pseudo-title title implies, “Against the Existence of Matter” is orchestrated to prove that
materialism, and the concept of matter more generally, is false. It seems to the reader during the
greater part of this selection that Berkeley assumes he is proving idealism right by proving
matter false. This is problematic because idealism is not the unique alternative to a matter-only
view; he could just as well say that he proves property dualism true. In ¶15, however, Berkeley
explains precisely what he thinks he is proving in this section. He is arguing that if we are good
empiricists, holding tightly that knowledge comes in by the senses, then to prove that no sense of
ours can tell whether extension or color exists in an outward object is to prove that neither
extension nor color exist outside the mind. Understanding this aim of Berkeley’s will help guide
the discussion that precedes this conclusion in his text.

idealist for the reason that so many misunderstand idealism. Berkeley, even with this admonition to the reader, is
often misread. See both Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human
Knowledge, Routledge (New York: 2001), 31 and the first chapters of Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: The
Philosophy of George Berkeley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Taxonomy of objects of human knowledge
So, then, to a walkthrough of “Against the Existence of Matter.” Berkeley’s first move is
to give us a taxonomy of human knowledge. This is an immense claim because Berkeley is
specific about this being a complete taxonomy; no object of human knowledge is left out of this
classification system. Note well that this is a taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge. The
fact that Berkeley is speaking of the objects of human knowledge (rather than speaking of human
knowledge itself) becomes critically important when he later makes the claim that he is for
“turning ideas into things, not things into ideas.”48, 49 Bear in mind that Berkeley’s preferred
word for ‘objects of human knowledge’ is ‘ideas.’ Jump ahead to “Difference between
knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits” under “Spirits and Epistemology” for discussion
on the importance of these objects of human knowledge as pertains to their being ‘ideas’ in
juxtaposition to ‘spirits.’ 50 Berkeley writes in ¶1 of the Principles,
“It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they
are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by
attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of
memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.”51
Berkeley gives us the three types or categories of objects of human knowledge. These
categories of the objects of human knowledge play a critical role in developing the Berkeleyan
metaphysics. They are also rather difficult to understand on a single pass. As such, I will address
them in one sense presently and will return to them in a more robust way later – specifically, I

48

Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in “Berkeley: Philosophical Writings” (Cambridge:
Cambridge, 2008), pg. 225.
49
I grant that this may be only a difference in terms (human knowledge vs. objects of human knowledge). In any
case, Berkeley’s phrasing becomes paramount in understanding his metaphysics. So, even if there was no
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will return to the categories of the objects of human knowledge and interpret them in light of
other passages in the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology.” For now, consider that one
(admittedly incomplete) way of seeing the distinction between the objects of human knowledge
is in terms of “avoidability.” The first type is unavoidable; the second type is avoidable if you
fail to reflect; and the third type is avoidable or not, depending on rather arbitrary factors.
1st-category objects of human knowledge

In what sense is the first type of object of human knowledge unavoidable? These
knowledge objects are “ideas actually imprinted on the senses.”52 These are the sensations that fit
the normal bill for the term “sensation:” I stub my toe and say ouch. This type of knowledge
object comes entirely from outside of the individual; they are, in Berkeley’s words, “imprinted”
onto the perceiver’s senses. If this were baseball, knowledge objects of the first variety would be
like a ball that hits you square on the jaw. Whether you wanted to catch it with your jaw, whether
you saw it coming, whether you tried to get your glove up… none of this really matters: the fact
is that you got slugged by a baseball. Answer me this: can you, in the pure power of your
volition, avoid the sensation of a broken jaw?
2nd-category objects of human knowledge

The second type of knowledge object is avoidable if you choose not to reflect on the
sense data you are receiving (read: if you choose to not intellectually engage with the firstcategory knowledge objects coming in through the senses). Berkeley says that these secondcategory knowledge objects are “such as are perceived by attending to the passions and
operations of the mind.”53 This second type of knowledge object is more avoidable than the first
in view of the fact that I choose whether to pay attention to the “passions and operations of the
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mind.” If we continue with the previous example, where in playing a game of baseball you get
clocked in the jaw, then the process of procuring these second-category knowledge objects is
akin to deciphering who threw the baseball and when. If you chose not to think about it, you
would not be confronted with the objects of human knowledge that are the ideas of the cause and
timing of your getting hit by the baseball. The critical difference between first and secondvariety knowledge objects is in the fact that you must pay attention to what passes in your mind
to receive the second (something like the mental effort involved in finding out who threw the ball
and thinking about the timing of when they threw it) and that you have nothing much to do with
choosing whether you feel the ball connecting with your jaw. Although it varies from situation to
situation, the presence of this second type of object of human knowledge is mostly under the
control of my volition.
3rd-category objects of human knowledge

The third type of knowledge object is best described in terms of its being within oneself
and its being sometimes willed, sometimes unwilled. These, Berkeley says, are “ideas formed by
help of memory and imagination.”54 These knowledge objects are sometime ephemeral,
sometimes long-lasting. Berkeley intends with this category to capture all of those slightly-lessthan-real thoughts that we entertain; memories, intuitions, fears, pains, and emotions belong to
this category of knowledge object. Bear in mind that the third type of knowledge object is not the
result of deep thinking or reasoning; those belong to the second type. The third category
knowledge objects do not necessarily accord with the time in which they are being had, neither
are they always under the control of the person that has them. Perhaps it is best to think of it like
this: there are knowledge objects coming directly from sensation due to input from without
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oneself (first category knowledge objects). There are also knowledge objects coming directly
from mental operations of one kind or another due to any variety of inputs both from without and
within oneself. There is a variety of these mental operations which belong to deep thinking and
intense reasoning – these are the second category knowledge objects. The rest of the knowledge
objects coming from mental operations belong to the third category of knowledge object.
Rendering the differences between categories of knowledge objects

It is important to clearly render the difference between these categories of objects of
human knowledge. If confused, they will cause serious problems down the road – this will
become clearer in the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology.” The first category stands distinct
from the second two because knowledge objects of the first category come from without the
individual whereas these come from within. Knowledge objects of the second two categories
come from a sort of reflection on other knowledge objects.
Not one of these objects (whether first, second, or third category) is more of a knowledge
object than the next; however, there is a degradation of epistemological reliability that occurs the
further one gets from knowledge objects coming from without the self (first category). The
second category is absolutely essential because it interprets and infuses meaning into mere
sensation. The third category is less epistemologically real than both of the others because it is
neither knowledge objects relating to your experience (first category) or knowledge objects
resulting from reflection on your experience or your memories and imaginations (second
category). It is, rather, your memories and your imaginations; your knowledge objects
concerning what happened in the past (whether accurate or not) and your knowledge objects
considering what could be in the future or just is in your mind (whether accurate or not). As
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mentioned already, this is an incomplete description of the objects of human knowledge. This
discussion picks up again in greater detail in “Spirits and Epistemology.”
Equality of the terms mind, soul, self, spirit
After giving us this taxonomy of knowledge objects, Berkeley moves on to define his use
of the term “mind.” More often than not, Berkeley speaks to “spirits” instead of “minds” or
“souls.” Here in ¶2, Berkeley equates all of these terms: “mind” is equal to “soul,” “spirit,” and
“self.”55 This is important in light of how many philosophies contain a distinction between mind
and spirt or differentiate mind from soul. For Berkeley, all of these terms indicate the same:
mind, self, soul, spirit… these are identical in Berkeley’s philosophy.
Esse is percipi, epistemological empiricism
Notice that at this point in the Principles, Berkeley is writing in a system-building mode.
He is giving definitions of terms and patching together the groundworks of idealism… he is, in
short, building up the idealist metaphysics. Possibly the most well-known phrase from this
system-building section is “esse is percipi,” which many take to be the central point of
Berkeleyan idealism. 56 Berkeley begins Principles ¶3 with the remark that no matter how
blended or jumbled-up, “the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense… cannot exist
otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.”57 Grayling remarks, “From these claims it follows
that the gap between things and ideas vanishes. If things are collections of qualities, and qualities
are sensible ideas, and sensible ideas exist only in mind, then what it is for a thing to exist is for
it to be perceived – in Berkeley’s phrase, to be is to be perceived: esse is percipi.”58
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One erroneous way to take Berkeley’s meaning is to assume that he is limiting the
domain of actually existing things to the scope of an individual’s perception. Such that, were I to
leave the room I am in, I could not say that the table continues to exist. Berkeley is not making
this claim! In fact, he is claiming much the opposite. Just before using the phrase “esse is
percipi,” Berkeley speaks of the table in his study. How might one say that the table exists?
Berkeley responds, “The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out
of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.”59
This sets up a rhetorical question, the answer of which highlights Berkeley’s theistic
roots. How can the table continue to exist, if esse is percipi, when no individual perceives it?
Berkeley replies in ¶6 that either the table must not exist when no one is looking, or else it must
“subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit.” The reason that an object is still there when I am not
looking (and neither is anyone else) is that God himself constantly perceives and maintains his
creation – this is the distinctly Christian bent of Berkeley’s philosophy. The grounding of reality
as we know it is not some external matter; no, the grounding of reality, the thing which makes X
still there when no one is looking, is God – the eternal spirit in whose mind subsist all things.
Notice also that this quotation highlights what we might call Berkeley’s “epistemological
empiricism.” How do we mean when we say that the table exists? Do we mean that it has certain
qualities? Do we mean it has a certain shape? Do we mean it is built of a certain type of stuff?
According to Berkeley, what we mean is that we perceive it.60 Existence (“to be,” or esse) is
determined by perception (is “to be perceived,” or percipi). If X is being perceived, this indicates
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that X must be existing. The critical component is that our way to determine whether a thing
exists is rooted in determining whether it is being perceived or not.61
Self-knowledge issue at heart of B.’s metaphysics
Branching from the claim that to be is to be perceived, one must ask whether Berkeley
considers all existing thing to be perceived things. Roberts confirms “that the being of sensible
things consists in their being perceived.”62 Yet, as already seen in ¶2, Berkeley speaks to things
which exist (spirits) which are not objects of human knowledge (ideas). Speaking to the
synonyms spirit, soul, and oneself, Berkeley writes, “By which words I do not denote any one of
my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, what is the same thing,
whereby they are perceived.”63 In ¶27, Berkeley defines “spirit” as “one, simple, undivided,
active being.” In ¶33, he defines real things as the ideas imprinted on the senses. In ¶142,
Berkeley clarifies that, “Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different that, when we say ‘they
exist,’ ‘they are known,’ or the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing
common to both natures.” If ideas are the sort of stuff that an individual might know, and “spirit”
is specifically, decidedly, and by nature not of this stuff, then presumably there should be no
knowledge of spirits. If the rationale for the existence of things without the mind is that their
existence is justified and defined by the mind’s perception of them, then we should only be able
to speak of things existing without the mind. Grayling writes of this issue as it appears in the
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, “The nub of the problem is that if we are
acquainted only with our own perceptions, and never with the things which are supposed to lie
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beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of those things, or even be justified in asserting
their existence?”64
In fact, the problem is graver even than this. Back in ¶2, Berkeley tells us that mind,
spirit, self, and soul are one and the same. If we simply swap our words out and restate the issue,
we get this startling revelation: if ideas are the stuff of what a perceiver can know, and if the self
is specifically, decidedly, and by nature not of this stuff, then we can have no knowledge of the
self. This problem (the second problem deriving from the second error made in considering “esse
is percipi”) is of critical importance to Berkeley’s philosophy – if Berkeley fails on this count,
then his metaphysics contains within itself the means of its own defeat.65
The question stands thusly: is there a way to remedy the discord between Berkeley’s
description of mind-external objects and his overall metaphysics? For now, it is best to leave this
question as it is and continue with our discussion of the main text of the Principles. I will return
to this question in the section on “Spirits and Epistemology” because answering to the issue of
self-knowledge in Berkeley’s metaphysics requires analysis of “Spirits and Epistemology” and
several selections from The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.
Locke, primary and secondary qualities
In answer to the question of how perceiving external things equates to them being ideas,
Berkeley begins in ¶10 and ¶11 a very interesting argument concerning the inseparability of
primary and secondary qualities of objects and how the relationship between these qualities
reflects upon the being of the objects in question themselves. The assertion from his opponents
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(notably John Locke) is that one must make a distinction between the primary and secondary
qualities of an object. The primary qualities of an object are those that exist in the external object
itself, namely, solidity (or bulk), motion, and extension (or shape).66 Secondary qualities are
mind-dependent qualities, such as color, taste, or the sharpness of a sound.67 Nadler notes, “Thus,
while primary qualities really belong to objects, secondary qualities (at least as we know them)
are merely the effects in the mind of the object's own primary qualities and of the bulk, texture,
and motion of the insensible parts of which the object is composed.”68, 69
The inseparability argument (of primary and secondary qualities)
The crux of the issue for Berkeley is that if one can prove that primary qualities always
go together with secondary qualities, and secondary qualities only exist in the mind, then primary
qualities must also exist only in the mind. Berkeley recognizes the limitations of what he is about
to argue. He is not proving that primary qualities do not exist in some external matter.70 Rather,
he is proving that, if our criteria for the realness of something is tied to our epistemic access to it,
then our inability to explain primary qualities as distinct from secondary qualities (which he
holds himself to have proved in the preceding paragraphs) entails that external objects, just like
their supposed primary qualities, must be mental.71 Nadler summarizes that “close examination
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reveals that the same or equally strong arguments can be used to prove either set of qualities
‘mind dependent.’ Since these two sets together comprise all the possible properties of a body,
bodies are thus reducible to collections of sensible qualities, all similarly in the mind of some
perceiver.”72
Fogelin calls this Berkeley’s “inseparability argument” because it relies centrally upon
the logic that if A only exists in X place, and B never appears except in conjunction with A, then
B must only exist in X place. In this case, B’s only existing in X place means that the one type of
thing (primary qualities) which would necessitate external matter (as the stuff in which primary
qualities reside) exists only in the mind. And if these primary qualities exist only in the mind, we
have no room to posit that objects external to the mind exist. Fogelin frames it in the following
way:
“We recognize intuitively that things of type A are inseparably united with things of type
B in the sense that we cannot so much as conceive of them existing independently. If it is
further acknowledged that things of type A cannot exist otherwise than in a mind, then, as
the reasoning goes, it must also be acknowledged that things of type B cannot exist
otherwise than in a mind.”73
The importance of this argument is that by it, Berkeley shows the explanatory
unnecessity of matter and, thereby, gives impetus to idealism. There is a slight problem with
Berkeley’s argumentation, however. Berkeley is attempting to position himself contrary to
Lockean materialism, which means Locke would have to be claiming that secondary qualities
exist only in the mind for Berkeley’s argument to hold sway against him. As Fogelin notes,
Locke does not take this view! Rather, “Locke held that secondary qualities do exist in objects,
though only as powers to produce certain sensations in us.”74 How, then, can Berkeley take
himself to have made a positive advance if the materialist position against which he is arguing
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does not fall subject to his axiomatic distinction between secondary and primary qualities? One
possible conclusion is that we should throw out Berkeley’s argument because he commits this
seeming ad hominem fallacy against Locke. For my own part, I think that ¶11 alleviates this
tension and allows us to keep Berkeley’s argument.
Doc. of abstract ideas founded on concept of mind-independent qualities
In ¶11 of the Principles, Berkeley makes a fascinating argument correlating the idea of
primary or secondary qualities existing in some external matter to the doctrine of abstract ideas.
He reasons that qualities like “great and small, swift and slow are allowed to exist no where
without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of
sense varies.”75 In a word, Berkeley is claiming that at least some subset of the qualities that all
philosophers recognize are seen on all hands as belonging only to the mind. Berkeley continues
to reason that if these qualities (like greatness or smallness, swiftness or slowness) exist only in
the mind, then “the extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small,
the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all.”76 So, then, what must this
extension and motion be which exists without the mind in some external matter? They must be
“extension in general, and motion in general; thus we see how much the tenet of extended,
moveable substances existing without the mind depends on that strange doctrine of abstract
ideas.”77
The point of the eleventh paragraph is none other than to show that the Lockean concept
of anything (much less some category such as primary or secondary qualities) existing without
the mind rests upon what Berkeley calls the “doctrine of abstract ideas.” This is the same
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doctrine he holds himself to have overcome in the Introduction to the Principles. In other words,
the ¶11 illustrates that there is no ad hominem fallacy occurring in the ¶10, provided that
Berkeley was right in the Introduction to the Principles and has, in fact, defeated the Lockean
contention for the doctrine of abstract ideas.
In Principles ¶91, Berkeley makes much the same point. Richard van Iten summarizes
Berkeley’s work there in the following words:
“First, he has delivered the final blow to the doctrine of abstract general ideas, along with
its "hidden" Platonism. This much is accomplished by the introduction of (Q) Qualities
must inhere in a substance. Second, he has arrived at idealism. The pattern followed in
arriving there can be sketched as follows. After eliminating material substance and
analyzing sensible objects as congeries of qualities, Berkeley invokes (Q). This leaves
him with one alternative, i.e., sensible objects must inhere in a mind (mental
substance).”78
This theme is common among Berkeley’s writings: that after abstract ideas go, idealism comes
in. As van Iten illustrates, this is precisely because the existence of mind-independent matter
rests upon the doctrine of abstract ideas and, once the throwing out of that doctrine is combined
with the necessity of qualities to inhere in a substance (Q), the only appropriate substance is
mind.
Denial of unity’s status as abstract idea

In Principles ¶12, Berkeley moves on to one final contention for the doctrine of abstract
ideas. Some philosophers, he alleges, claim that unity is a simple idea. In this context, “simple”
is meant to indicate that unity, in the fashion of Locke’s abstract ideas, can be conceived in
exclusion of its normally attendant qualities. Berkeley counters that unity, just like the greatness
and smallness or fastness and slowness from the inseparability argument in ¶10, changes with a
person’s perspective.79 Is the unity of a single meter the same as the unity of a single foot? No –
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they differ by a notable amount. Even more obviously: is the unity of a single gallon the same as
the unity of a single yard? Of course not. Although there is obviously a quality which each of
these shares (the quality of being “one” of something), there is nothing more than this general
sharing of a quality. Each unity is a unity of something particular, even more obviously,
Berkeley claims, than is extension or motion.
By the same argument as in the Introduction to the Principles, this indicates that although
we recognize unity in multiple cases, the thought that this necessitates an abstract “unity” which
they all share is a trick of language; we have no abstract concept of unity. As Jesseph concisely
puts it, “The most general characterization of Berkeley’s philosophy of mathematics identifies it
as a denial of abstractionism.”80 At each step, here including even philosophy of mathematics,
Berkeley denies the doctrine of abstract ideas as presented in the Introduction to the Principles.
In showing that even unity is mind-dependent, Berkeley demonstrates again that there is nothing
– and really nothing – that exists independently of mind.
Circumspection on defeating abstract ideas

Having shown that nothing exists independently of the mind, Berkeley circumspectly
gives us his conclusion on the matter. Using extension and color as his example of qualities
supposed to exist in external matter, he asserts in ¶15 that he has proven not that there is no
extension or color in an outward object, but that our senses tell us nothing of an object’s true
extension or color.81 This conclusion hits home on Berkeley’s epistemological empiricism. If we
remain true to the epistemological empiricism which Berkeley endorses in ¶3, then the fact that
our senses tell us nothing of an object’s true extension or color (meaning its extension or color as
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they exist in some external matter) indicates that there is no such thing as mind-independent
matter.82
Master Argument: conclusion of “Against the Existence of Matter”
Berkeley concludes “Against the Existence of Matter” with what scholars have called his
“Master Argument.” In ¶22-23, “Berkeley gives a version of what has comes to be called ‘The
Master Argument’ because of the apparent strength with which he endorses it.”83 The axe of this
argument is that mind-independent objects cannot be conceived of – and what cannot be
conceived of, based on Berkeley’s epistemological empiricism, cannot be said to exist. The court
length of the Master Argument is telling of how much stock Berkeley puts into this argument.
Although Berkeley gives the Master Argument in ¶22-23 of the Principles, he retells it more
interestingly in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In order to dissect the
argument, we will turn presently to the second of these dialogues.
The Master Argument in the Second Dialogue

The Master Argument gets at the question of whether perception is fundamental to an
object’s reality. Imagine, if you would, a tree in an open field. Does this tree exist independent of
your perception? In the personage of Philonous (the quasi-Berkeley character), Berkeley asks
rhetorically: “How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?”84
Hylas responds that this is a contradiction; of course you cannot simultaneously see a thing and
have that thing be unseen. Philonous then jumps from seeing to conceiving, saying, “Is it not as
great a contradiction to talk of ‘conceiving’ a thing which is unconceived?”85 He continues,
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“And what is conceived is surely in the mind… How then came you to say, you conceived a
house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?”86 The ultimate conclusion
to the Master Argument comes only a paragraph further down the same page. Berkeley writes in
the voice of Philonous, “You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the
mind, from their appearance or manner wherein they are perceived.”87 Lisa Downing notes that
there are several authors who have picked apart Berkeley’s argument on the claim that he
conflates our representation of a thing with the thing itself. Thus, in the argument she cites from
Pitcher’s work, Berkeley’s Master Argument fails because it ignores the difference between that
which is our representation of a tree and that tree itself.88 I find Pitcher’s critique to be very
unsatisfying because it ignores Berkeley’s underlying critique of representationalism. Berkeley’s
very point is that there is no verifiable difference between the supposed actual tree in the field
and our supposed representation of the tree – an appeal to the senses simply confirms that we
have an idea of the tree and, further, that we have never conceived of an unconceived tree
(because this is a manifest contradiction). Therefore, on grounds of his epistemological
empiricism, Berkeley is justified in making the claim that nothing exists “independent and out of
all minds whatsoever.”89
Returning to Berkeley’s iteration of the Master Argument in the Principles, we see that
he makes the same point as in the Dialogues. In this case, he gives the example of trees in a park
and books in a closet. “But say you,” he writes in ¶23 of the Principles, “surely there is nothing
easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by
to perceive them.” Berkeley sets the stage to look as though objects easily exist alone and
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unperceived. Yet, not so fast, Berkeley reasons: “But, do not you yourself perceive or think of
them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of
imagining or forming ideas in your mind.” Claiming that one conceives of something
unperceived does nothing to support the claim that mind-independent objects exist. “To make
this out,” Berkeley writes, “it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or
unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.”90
In the first paragraph of my commentary on the Master Argument, I wrote that the axe of
the argument is that you cannot conceive of mind-independent objects. How so? One cannot
perceive of mind-independent objects because to perceive an object is precisely to prove its mind
dependency! Since every object which you perceive is mind-dependent, and since there is
therefore no proof for any unperceived objects, the following must hold: we have no ground to
claim that there is such a thing as mind-independent matter. The Master Argument concludes
Berkeley’s thoughts in “Against the Existence of Matter.” His next task in the Principles is to
address a long string of possible objections to his idealism. For us, the next stop is at ¶135-156
and the turn to the subject of spirits and epistemology.

“SPIRITS AND EPISTEMOLOGY” (Or: Philosophy of self and other minds)
Introductory notes on “Spirits and Epistemology”
My tactic concerning “Spirits and Epistemology”91 is somewhat different than that for
“Against the Existence of Matter” and the introduction to the Principles. It is best in this section
to follow a topical, rather than exegetical, approach. Berkeley’s work in “Spirits and
Epistemology” centers around one simple question: can I have knowledge of spirits? In the
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subsection, “Self-knowledge issue at the heart of B.’s metaphysics,” I promised a further
exploration of the subject of self-knowledge and the knowledge of other spirits.92 This is a
tenuous issue for Berkeley because of his strict definitions of the objects of human knowledge in
¶1 of the Principles. Rephrased briefly, Berkeley’s problem is that he has robustly distinguished
between spirits (which are active, thinking beings – PHK ¶27, 135, 138, 139, et al.) and ideas
(which are passive and derive existence only from being perceived – PHK ¶25, 27, 33, 139, et
al.). Cummins notes that “the material which precedes the metaphysical/religious finale, Sections
135 through 145, considers chiefly the consequences of the sharp contrast between minds and
ideas, which was introduced in Section 2 and expanded in Section 27.”93 As Berkeley makes
perfectly clear in ¶25 and ¶27 especially, spirits perceive ideas – and ideas are so unlike spirits
that they cannot even resemble them. “Minds are not sensibles,” writes Cummins, “and cannot
be represented by them or their images, because the only thing like an idea is an idea, and the
two are utterly unalike.”94 One must get at spirits somehow in a philosophy that makes such a big
deal of them – for Berkeley, spirits are essential because they are the sole substance and
grounding of ideas.95 If he cannot get at them (spirits) by having an idea of them, then it must be
that we have some sort of knowledge (but no direct ideas) of spirits. Berkeley rejects the
“implied major premise” of the unlikeness of minds and ideas that “the only knowledge is
knowledge of or through ideas.”96 This begs the question: how does one have knowledge of
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spirits? What type of knowledge does one have of spirits? Let us examine these questions
closely.
Difference between knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits
First, the most pressing question in its broadest form: how does Berkeley tally the need to
have knowledge of spirits and the inability of ideas to resemble spirits? I think the best entry into
Berkeley’s answer is to pretend for the time being that we can have knowledge of spirits. If we
make this pretension, then there is a critical follow-up question: does my knowledge of spirits
(either of my own soul, of someone else’s soul, or of both if it is the same kind of knowledge)
differ in kind from my knowledge of ideas? Berkeley answers with a stout yes – the knowledge
of spirits is not the same as the knowledge of ideas.97
The logic is that spirits have ideas, not more spirits – the claim being that ideas and spirits
are so vastly and perfectly unalike that if ideas are what a spirit “operates about” (Berkeley’s
wording from ¶27 PHK), then a spirit most obviously cannot operate about spirits. Here is
Berkeley’s way of making the same point in ¶135 PHK, “I shall here add that a spirit has been
shown to be the only substance or support, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can exist. But
that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should be it self an idea, or like an idea, is
evidently absurd.” So far, Berkeley is very clear: ideas and spirits are perfectly unalike, ideas
being passive and deriving their existence from being perceived by spirits and spirits being the
substance of ideas and deriving their existence from perceiving and thinking.98
Here’s the snag: how are we then speaking and reasoning about spirits? After all, if ideas
are what the mind operates about (¶27 PHK), if we are operating about something when speaking
presently of spirits, and if spirits are absolutely not ideas, then how are we speaking of spirits?
97
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How, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas, and spirits are not ideas, do we
gain a place from which to have knowledge of spirits? The short answer is the concession that
we are indeed only ever speaking of ideas. Berkeley makes it obvious that no matter what subject
we approach, we are operating about ideas – not spirits.99 Even if we say the word spirit, we are
still working with an idea. Berkeley sees that this is problematic; spirits are essential to his
metaphysics. The first step to expanding the answer to this issue stems from edits Berkeley
makes in Principles ¶27, ¶138, and ¶140.
Of all the edits that Berkeley makes in the second edition of the Principles, these are the
most important. His edits are almost completely devoted to clarifying how and in what sense we
have knowledge of spirits. The most important change is in his use of the term “notions.” In the
1710 edition of the Principles (1st edition), he used notions and ideas interchangeably. Look, for
example, at the last phrase of ¶138 in the 1710 edition: “… it is evident there can be no idea or
notion of a spirit.” In the 1734 edition, he omits the words “or notion,” paving the way for a new
use of the term in ¶140, where he adds the term notion in the 1734 edition. Here is how the first
sentence of ¶140 reads in the 1734 edition: “In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an
idea or a notion of spirit.” So, by the 1734 edition, notion has become the technical term for the
knowledge that one has of spirits. As to a technical definition, notions appear to be some kind of
inferred ideas. This definition is corroborated and expanded in the 1734 edition (3rd edition) of
the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 100
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Defending view that Berkeley has two fundamental categories of knowledge
Using Berkeley’s now-established terminology, we can say that we have two kinds of
knowledge: ideas and notions. Berkeley’s use of the term idea in this sense causes some
confusion. In “Spirits and Epistemology”, Berkeley equivocates the term idea to mean on the one
hand, “the information one gets directly from sense perception” and on the other hand, “any of
the processes which one does notice or could notice in one’s mind.” In large brush strokes,
Berkeley’s play is to conflate these definitions such that literally any subject of one’s attention,
no matter its’ origin, is to be called an idea. I think that Berkeley makes this all-are-ideas point
and sticks to it – meaning that he equivocates by accident, not design, and his argument should
be given the benefit of the doubt. The problem is that in a section like “Spirits and
Epistemology,” where he distinguishes the two definitions to nuance his epistemology in order to
talk of spirits, he reuses the word idea and juxtaposes it to the word notions. This gives us the
mixed message that at once all human knowledge is composed of ideas and some human
knowledge is composed of notions, which are like vaguer ideas. For Berkeley’s system to
function, we must have both ideas (the first definition) and notions (the second definition) and
we must have each of these as types or versions or forms of the objects of human knowledge. It
needs to look something like this:
1) We have objects of human knowledge
2) These could be ideas (direct knowledge)
3) These could be notions (inferred knowledge)
These types of knowledge, whether direct or inferred (2 or 3), are equally composed of these
objects of human knowledge (1), which objects must fall into one of the three categories of
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human knowledge given in Principles ¶1. Defending this view as Berkeley’s own requires us to
look outside of the Principles by turning to The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.
Defending knowledge objects dichotomy from Dialogues

As stated above, the most fundamental paradigm of knowledge is that each object of
human knowledge (while all being equally objects of human knowledge) is of one of two sorts of
knowledge: directly sensed knowledge or inferred knowledge.101 Here is my present thesis: while
every object of human knowledge falls into the taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge
from PHK ¶1, the distinction between directly sensed and inferred knowledge comes logically
prior to it.
I hold this to be the case for three reason. First, the primacy of the position of the
argument for an inferred versus directly sensed knowledge distinction in the text of the
Dialogues. It is the very first argument that Philonous makes as proof for idealism. This tells us,
if nothing else, that Berkeley esteems this argument highly. Second, Berkeley publishes three
editions of the Dialogues (where this argument figures prominently in dialogues one and two)
and two editions of the Principles (where this argument figures notably in PHK ¶27, ¶80, ¶140,
¶142, and as backdrop for “Spirits and Epistemology” generally). If nothing else, the number of
times he edits and republishes versions of this argument should tell us how important it is to his
own thinking. Third, the taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge (PHK ¶1) functions well
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if it is logically preceded by the directly sensed versus inferred knowledge distinction, but not
vice versa.102
In order to support my three claims, we must first examine the argument in question.
Beginning on page 157, Philonous (the quasi-Berkeley personage) begins arguing with Hylas
(the quasi-materialist/skeptic personage) over the causes of things.103 Hylas, being the quasimaterialist, takes the Lockean position on primary versus secondary qualities. Just as in the
Principles, Berkeley argues against the position that there is mind-independent matter (or
substance) in which qualities (such as texture, color, sound, and shape) subsist. In the guise of
Philonous, Berkeley presents several example scenarios designed to pry open the issue of what is
directly sensed versus what is inferred, and specifically what this tells us about the question of
the existence of mind-independent matter.
Philonous first presents the question in a standardized form. He asks, “Are those things
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be
said to be ‘sensible’ which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?”104
Philonous is in the process of critiquing Hylas’s concept of sensible things. Hylas just defined
sensible things as “those things which are perceived by the senses”105 – but this definition needs
clarifying in Philonous’s view. What does Philonous’s two-pronged question intend to clarify
about Hylas’s definition of sensible things? It aims at prying Hylas back from claiming that
things discovered by way of inference are sensible things. This is the route to the error that there
102
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is mind-independent substance, Berkeley insinuates. To clarify his concern, Philonous gives an
example concerning a person reading a book. “In reading a book, what I immediately perceive
are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God,
virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things or perceived by sense, there is no
doubt; but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.”106
Here, as in the Principles, Berkeley uses the term “notions” to describe the sort of
knowledge that one has of things determined by inference rather than by direct sensation. In this
case, it is the “notions of God, virtue, truth, &c.” The letters on the page are sensible things, and
therefore are ideas (they are on the directly perceived side of the dichotomy between inferred and
directly sensed knowledge). The concepts (or, to use Berkeley’s technical term, the notions)
insinuated by these letters on the page are real objects of knowledge – only, they are not objects
of knowledge by the same fashion as the letters themselves. Hylas admits that Philonous has
made a good point and agrees that sensible things are “those only which can be perceived
immediately by sense.”107 Elsewhere, Berkeley cleanly equates sensible things with ideas (ideas
in the sense of the word within the inferred/directly perceived knowledge distinction).108
Philonous carries on with his argument: “Does it not follow from this, that though I see one part
of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason does thence evidently conclude there must
be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or
perceived by the sense of seeing?”109
Philonous is already starting to make the grander point at play. The axe of his argument is
not just that sensible things are of a certain sort – his argument aims to prove that the causes of
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sensible things are not themselves sensible things. He is not doing so in a generalized or purely
conceptual way, either. The example is quite practical. Look at the sky during sunset and pay
attention to its colors. The reds, the burnt oranges, the deep purples and hazy blues… we directly
perceive the color of the sky, but the cause of its color? We never perceive the cause of the color
because the cause of a sensible thing is not itself sensible! Philonous sharpens his point with
another example: “In like manner, though I hear [a] variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to
hear the causes of those sounds.”110 Now in the voice of Hylas, Berkeley gives the conclusion to
this argument:
“I tell you once for all, that by ‘sensible things’ I mean those only which are perceived by
sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive
immediately, for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions
from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to
reason.”111
Sensible things are those things directly perceived by sense.112 Things directly perceived
by sense are ideas.113 We see here that Berkeley is making a fundamental claim about human
knowledge: at rock bottom, humans have knowledge of two kinds – directly sensed knowledge
(“…by ‘sensible things’ I mean those only which are perceived by sense…”) and inferred
knowledge (“…The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances,
which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.”). At the outset of this section, I
alleged to prove that the distinction between directly sensed and inferred knowledge comes
logically prior to Berkeley’s tripartite taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge in ¶1 of the
Principles. In fact, the method by which this dichotomy fits prior to the Principles ¶1 trichotomy
is rather simple.
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Fitting Dialogues dichotomy with Principles trichotomy

The first two categories of the objects of human knowledge in PHK ¶1 are: “ideas
actually imprinted on the senses” and “such as are perceived by attending to the passions and
operations of the mind.”114 These two categories seem familiar, do they not? Here, Berkeley is
using “idea” in the conflated sense I mentioned a few paragraphs back – where he means at once
“the information one gets directly from sense perception” and “any of the processes which one
does notice or could notice in one’s mind.” These two definitions map directly onto these first
two categories of the objects of human knowledge! 115 Where does the third category of the
objects of human knowledge fall? It seems to me that in the PHK ¶1 trichotomy, Berkeley is
attempting to get at a nuance within the way that we perceive our own mental operations. There
are mental processes which generally map onto the external world like passions (love, hate, fear,
etc.) and operations (willing, deciding, reasoning, etc.). There are also mental processes which
do not cleanly correspond to anything happening in the world outside of us, at least not at the
time at which these processes are occurring. Memory (re-conjuring past operations and passions,
etc.) and imagination (considering possible operations and passions, and ways things could
change or be altered in the external world, etc.) both fall into this category.
Whether Berkeley has a well-reasoned rationale for breaking up the dichotomy of the
Dialogues into the trichotomy of the Principles, I am not sure. Commentators on Berkeley have
expressed a variety of opinions.116 Perhaps he saw a pressing need to insist on the distinction
between types of mental processes – the reasons why are not clear. In interpreting the trichotomy
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of Principles ¶1, Furlong takes note of entry 775 in Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries, a
collection of Berkeley’s personal notebooks. Furlong writes, “The entry, and the deletion it
contains, show him to be restricting ideas to the two kinds, namely, ideas of sense and ideas of
imagination – roughly, sense data and mental images.”117
Terminology to repair Berkeley’s “idea” equivocation
The real confusion in Berkeley’s writings is this unfortunate equivocation on the term
“idea” – if he had used separate terms to indicate the objects of human knowledge (the stuff of
which all human knowledge is composed) and the things that constitute directly perceived
knowledge (the narrow sense of “idea” constituting directly sensed knowledge as juxtaposed to
the “notions” constituting inferred knowledge, or Furlong’s “mental images”), his writings
would be much clearer.118 It seems to me that, when parred down to the most fundamental level,
the trichotomy of PHK ¶1 is nothing more than a restatement of the dichotomy for which
Berkeley argues in the Dialogues. I propose that from this point forward, in order to clarify
which definition of idea I am using, the conflated, categorical version of the term (meaning any
subject of one’s attention, no matter its’ origin – what Berkeley calls the objects of human
knowledge) is to be called idea OHK (OHK indicates object of human knowledge) and the narrow
version of the term (meaning exclusively the objects of human knowledge gained from direct
sense perception) is to be called idea DSK (DSK indicated directly sensed knowledge). To restate
for clarity: idea OHK is the genus defined as the objects of human knowledge. Ideas DSK and
notions constitute the two species of the genus ideas OHK.
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Returning to the Q of self-knowledge
Where does this leave us with the problem of self-knowledge? Can one have knowledge
of spirits? I hope it is becoming obvious at this point why Berkeley answers with such a
resounding yes in the “Spirits and Epistemology” section of the Principles. The issue as stated
before is how, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas, and spirits are not
ideas, we have knowledge of spirits. This issue exists only because Berkeley equivocates the
term idea to his own detriment. Allow me to restate the question using the clarified terms idea
OHK and

idea DSK. How, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas OHK, and

spirits are not ideas OHK, do we have knowledge of spirits? The question has become a nonsequitur; the fact that the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas OHK and the fact
that the term spirit is not identical with the term idea OHK do not play into the question of the
knowability of spirits, just as it would not if we replaced spirits in this question with ideas DSK.
The question of spirits or ideas DSK not being identical with ideas OHK has no input into the
question of our having knowledge of spirits or ideas DSK. From the very giving of the dichotomy
of human knowledge in the Dialogues, Berkeley has answered this sort of question. We can have
knowledge of directly sensed things (ideas DSK being the objects of directly sensed knowledge)
and knowledge of inferred things (spirits being the objects of inferred knowledge)119
Two outstanding questions
There are two connected outstanding questions concerning Berkeley’s claim that we can
have knowledge of the causes of things.120 First, how certain are we that Berkeley’s argument
(that we have inferred knowledge, which type of knowledge is of the causes of things) proves
that the causes of things are not material? Berkeley has certainly proved that there is something
119
120
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which stands a step behind our ideas DSK and he has certainly proved that we have knowledge of
that something-a-step-behind (by inference). How does Berkeley safeguard himself from having
accidentally lent equally as much weight to the materialist position as to his own idealism? To
put it another way, does Berkeley adequately ensure that his argument will not drag-and-drop
into the materialist logic for the something-behind being mind-independent matter? Second, how
certain are we that Berkeley allows himself room to argue for spirits or minds as the substance of
ideas? He has argued extensively against the idea that there is material substance behind the
qualities that we perceive on the grounds that one cannot directly sense this material
substance.121 It seems as though he must backtrack to make the claim that there is a substance
behind our ideas, even if he changes the character of that substance to some degree. Cummins
notes the key paragraphs as ¶26 and ¶49 of the Principles.122 In ¶26, Berkeley employs the term
“spiritual substance” to support his idealism. In ¶49, Berkeley seems to deny the existence of any
spiritual substance.123 Does Berkeley contradict his own logic by at once arguing against the
grounding of sensible qualities in a substance and arguing for a substance behind sensible
qualities? Let us tackle these questions individually.
First outstanding question

Berkeley is positing that spirit is the only substance and that ideas are moved, altered,
changed, invented, and even destroyed by spirits.124 If Berkeley is on board with the proposition
that there is something behind the ideas that we perceive, how can Berkeley conclude that this
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something is not mind-independent matter? Berkeley’s defense is that he has already defeated
the notion of abstract ideas. If the argument against abstract ideas succeeds, and Berkeley is right
that something has got to be behind sensible qualities, then we are left asking what kind of a
thing meets these criteria. The “thing behind” must be active (since it cannot be an idea, and
ideas are by definition passive) and it must not necessitate the process of abstraction (although,
one should recall that generalizing is still an option – refer back to the discussion of the
Principles’ introduction). For Berkeley’s part, the only type of thing meeting both criteria is
spirits.
In summary, Berkeley’s argument for spiritual substance would only work as a plug-andplay argument for material substance if he had not laid out these two accompanying criteria: that
the substance of ideas must be active and it must not rest on the doctrine of abstract ideas.
Granted, this answer is only satisfactory if Berkeley’s argument against abstract ideas works. It is
apparent from the Principles that Berkeley thinks he has soundly defeated abstract ideas.125 If
Berkeley’s argument against abstraction succeeds as he thinks it does, then he is in perfect
position to answer the critic who demands why his move for spiritual substance is not
hypocritical with regards to his attack on material substance.
Second outstanding question

The best answer to the second outstanding question starts with a look at Berkeley’s words
in ¶26 and ¶49. In ¶26, Berkeley begins by noting the constant “succession of ideas” that
confronts us. He reasons that “there is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend,
and which produces and changes them.”126 This cause of ideas cannot itself be an idea or a
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combination of ideas; in ¶25, Berkeley made this point very clear. If this cause of ideas cannot be
an idea or a combination of ideas, then it must be a substance.127 “But,” Berkeley writes, “it has
been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance; it remains therefore that the cause of
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.”128 In ¶49, Berkeley answers an objection to
idealism based on the relationship between qualities and substance. The problem for Berkeley is
that qualities inhere in their substance – and as Cummins show, this is a serious problem for
Berkeley in that spirit is supposed to be immortal and cannot, therefore, take on a quality like
extension.
“On the traditional doctrine of substance, a quality’s name is or can be predicated of any
substance in which it inheres. Thus the objection portrays Berkeley as holding the
qualities that make up sensible objects inhere in the mind that perceives them, in which
case their names are to be predicated of that mind. This result would commit Berkeley to
extension, figure, and motion being predicated of the mind, a very embarrassing result for
a philosopher who insists again and again that the mind is unextended and who is anxious
to secure the natural immortality of the soul on the basis of its unextendedness.”129
So, how does Berkeley rectify the need to have a substance as the support of ideas (PHK
¶26) and his need for the mind to not take on the qualities which it somehow supports (PHK
¶49)? Here is the question as Berkeley words it: “It may perhaps be objected, that if extension
and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured, since
extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in
which it exists.”130 He responds to this objection, “I answer, those qualities are in the mind only
as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea.”131
Cummins rightly notes that “the crucial words are ‘qualities are in the mind only as they are
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perceived by it.”132 The way out of the conundrum is that Berkeley is offering an alternative
manner in which a substance supports its qualities. “As a quality is in the mind only by way of
idea, that is, only as being perceived by that mind,” Cummins comments, “there is no basis for
predicating it of the mind as there would be were being perceived interpreted as inhering in.”133
In other words, Berkeley is toying with the fundamental concept of what it is to be a substance.
In so doing, Berkeley resolves the tension between the need to have a support for ideas and the
traditional implications of that support being a substance.

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Introductory notes to “Philosophy of Mind”
Philosophy of mind is a broad field of study, including everything from classic questions
(such as the mind/body problem) to recent developments (such as incorporating advances in
quantum theory). In “Spirits and Epistemology,” we have specifically addressed the Berkeleyan
answer to the question of the knowledge of spirits.134 Before concluding, I want to place idealism
within the broader framework of leading philosophies of mind today. I will do this using a
hypothetical which I am calling the ‘question of worlds.’ This question speaks specifically to the
role of substance in determining one’s philosophical camp. Traditionally, questions of substance
within philosophy of mind fall under the ‘mind/body problem.’135 This is a large category; as
Alva Noë notes, “There isn’t a mind/body problem – there are many mind/body problems.” 136
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Of these mind/body problems, I am choosing to address the question of the difference of
substance between the mind and the body.

The Question of Worlds
In this hypothetical, the question of first importance is how many worlds exist. In this
context, a world is a full set of objects and their operations. An object is something which can act
or be acted upon (like a rock with potential momentum or a golf club in full swing). An
operation designates that thing or things which a given object can do: the golf club might swing,
the car might move forward, and the rock might fall downhill. Functionally, the distinction
between an object and an operation is like nouns and verbs. One of them sets the stage for
something to happen (an airplane), the other denotes the thing that does happen (to fly). Consider
the terms “world,” “object,” and “operation” to be our working vocabulary.
A car is a fairly clean example of what I mean by a world. Why? Because it looks to
operate independently of anything outside of itself. It has hoses, a transmission, an engine, a vast
number of fluids, and all sorts of other mechanical and aesthetic components. Built perfectly, a
car will virtually run on its own. Nonetheless, a car is not a perfect example of a world because it
also needs a host of outside factors to make it drive. Refueling, regular maintenance, and a good
mechanic, to name a few, are essential to a car’s functioning. A car is like a world in the sense
that it looks to function independent of anything besides itself; a car is not a world because it
does not fully succeed in this aim. Speaking technically, a car is not a world because it cannot
singularly describe its own existence. To answer “what is a car” takes the introduction of items
which are not the car itself. The fuel comes in from outside the vehicle; likewise, for
maintenance and many other components throughout the car’s lifetime. This explanatory issue
continues in a branching fashion for each item on which the car depends. The car needs a
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manufacturer; the manufacturer needs employees; the employees need housing; housing requires
real estate; etc.
At some point, however, it can reasonably be expected that this line of dependence will
stop, and we will be left with the conglomerate whole. Each operation in our conglomerate will
work on some object within the system and each object’s properties will be explained by other
operations and objects. In this conglomerate, no explanatory gaps will remain; each piece will be
fully explained. Critically, each piece will be fully explained by the other pieces within this
conglomerate – within the whole, no outside help is needed in any form to explain any of its
components. To make a short resume of this hypothetical: there are worlds (explanatorily
complete sets of objects and operations), objects (the “nouns,” or things that can act or be acted
upon in some manner), and operations (the “verbs,” or actions done by and to the objects). To
return to the question asked at the start of this experiment: how many worlds exist?
Conceptually, I can imagine that the world which includes the car and manufacturer
exists without excluding the thought that some other world exists. An implied bit of the
definition of a world is this: that were two worlds to exist, they must exist in a perfectly neverthe-twain-shall-meet fashion. The relationship between these two existing worlds must be
precisely that the two relate in no way whatsoever; if they connect even marginally, we have one
big world, not two small worlds. For Berkeley, there is only one world. His inseparability
argument would be aimed, in this hypothetical, at demonstrating that there is only one
explanatorily complete set of objects and operations. When broken down, Berkeley would say,
even Locke’s ingenious distinctions between primary and secondary qualities demonstrate there
to be only one world, the mental world. This claim is significant because it clearly marks the
break between idealism and its two chief competitors, dualism (in its various forms) and
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physicalism (in its various forms). Berkeley plays an intriguing role between these philosophies
of mind. Both idealism and physicalism are monistic; meaning, at metaphysical rock-bottom,
they posit only one kind of substance. Dualisms are dualistic; meaning, at metaphysical rockbottom, there are two kinds of stuff – yet, one of these kinds of stuff (the substance of mind)
looks significantly more like Berkeley’s substance than does the single kind of substance of his
monistic counterpart. Additionally, Berkeley manages, through the introduction of ideas as the
objects of human knowledge, to hold onto dualism’s assertion that there are two kinds of existing
things. In a word, Berkeley takes on pieces of each competitor’s philosophy and, in my
estimation, crafts a monism that retains the benefits both of dualisms and monisms.
Dualism and the question of worlds
One must be careful in understanding the dualist’s assertion that there are two kinds of
stuff. “It is important,” writes Lowe, “not to confuse ‘substance’ in this sense with ‘substance’
understood as denoting some kind of stuff, such as water or iron.”137 In this context, “a
substance… is to be understood, quite simply, as any sort of persisting object or thing which is
capable of undergoing changes in its properties over time.”138 Put otherwise, a substance is “that
which exists independently as an objective entity. A substance, such as a dog, is thus
distinguished from a property, such as the dog’s color, which must be possessed or owned by a
substance.”139 The simplified rationale of dualism is this: that on analysis, there seem to be two
substances which are capable of undergoing change in properties over time. The one is physical
substance and the other is mental substance.
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In other words, the dualist answers the question of worlds by positing two worlds. One of
these worlds is the full set of mental objects and their operations and the other is the full set of
physical objects and their operations. For Descartes, the quintessential dualist, the logic
underlying the claim that there must be two substances (not just one) is that there are two
explanatorily separate realms of reality, the mental and the physical.140 In Cartesian terminology,
we have two substances, mind and body, which are fully separate. Thus, applying dualism back
to the question of worlds, we see that there are two worlds, one mental and one bodily, which
exist as separate sets of objects (physical objects and mental objects, like baseballs and
decisions) and operations (like throwing baseball and choosing an entrée).
The problem for dualism is causation. The physical world does not seem explanatorily
complete without accounting for the influence of mental activity. I tied my shoes, I chose to run,
and I ran through a thicket along the way, getting briars and burs all over my socks. Must not I
account for the choice to tie my shoes, the choice to run, and the choice of running path to
explain the briars and burrs on my socks? Lowe comments on the interaction problem, “The
alleged conceptual difficulties centre upon the contention that we cannot really make sense of
there being causal transactions between items as radically different in nature from one another as
the dualist conceives mental and physical states to be.”141 If the two worlds interact, it seems we
have one big world instead of two. The problem of causal interactions between worlds is the
ultimate problem for dualism and has caused many to look elsewhere for an answer to the
question of worlds. Is there a way to retain the explanatory advantage of having two substances
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while avoiding the causality problem? Berkeley’s idealism may offer a way forward – we will
discuss this momentarily.
Physicalism and the question of worlds
The physicalist’s suggestion is that if having two worlds gives us trouble, perhaps there is
only one world. In this case, the one world is described as something purely physical; that is, the
physicalist is positing that beneath everything there is a bedrock of physical something. Each
object and operation are physical. The physicalist position sounds already like what Berkeley
argues against in the Principles and Dialogues. To a great extent, this is true; bear in mind,
however, that there are key distinctions between the “physicalism” of Locke, which is usually
called Lockean atomism, and today’s physicalism.142 Atomism is technically a type of
materialism (which in turn is normally cast as a type of physicalism). Materialism is “the view
that only material objects exist;” physicalism differs in that they also “accept the existence of
matter and energy.”143, 144 For our present purposes, these distinctions are superficial. At heart,
atomism, materialism, and physicalism (no matter the chosen term) indicate the proposition that
rather than two worlds, there is one world – and in this world, the bedrock characteristic of all
things (apparently ‘mental’ things included) is physicality. The ultimate problem for these views
is that they do not satisfactorily explain the mental. Thus, Howell’s book (see footnote 142
above); explaining consciousness and other distinctly mental phenomena is difficult for the
ardent physicalist. As Noë puts it, “it saddens me to have to say that very little progress has been
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made in neuroscience on these questions;”145 these questions being what it is to have
consciousness and mental activity in a purely physical world.
Idealism and the question of worlds
As idealism connects to both…

As mentioned, Berkeley finds a sort of middle ground between dualism and physicalism.
He finds this middle ground in that he takes on important characteristics of both philosophies.
From dualism, he takes on the reality of mental activity. He does not, like the physicalist, try to
reduce mentality to something seemingly nonmental (physical matter). He also, like the dualist,
recognizes the need for having two sorts of existing things (minds and ideas) but differs in that
only mind is a substance whereas dualism posits mental substance and physical substance. From
physicalism, he takes on that there is only one substance. Importantly, he also takes on the
reductionist aspect of physicalism; meaning, the physicalist holds that everything can be reduced
in one sense or another to a single substance. Berkeley differs in that his substance is mind, not
matter – yet, this reductionist tendency is critical to his thought.146
Dualistic issues that idealism resolves…

In positing two substances, the dualist clears up some notable issues regarding mental and
physical properties. Chief among these issues is that pains and microwaves seem to be two very
different sorts of things. The dualist position carries explanatory power in its ability to simply
say that pains belong to mental substance and microwaves belong to physical substance.
However, as mentioned already, the dualist position struggles heavily in regard to causality. How
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does a change in mental substance (the pain I experience on stubbing my toe) cause a change in
physical substance (the “Ow!” I yell in response)? On a cost-benefit analysis, dualism is
generally disregarded by philosophers today; the issue of causation seems a bigger detractor than
dualism’s explanatory power is a positive.147 The real hero of the story would be a philosophy
that can retain the ability to speak of two types of existing things and avoid the issue of causality.
I hold that idealism is this philosophy. Where the division between mental and physical
substance causes problems for the dualist, idealism enjoy a simpler explanation of causation:
both the pain I experience on stubbing my toe and the Ow! I yell in response have their roots in
the same substance – mind.148 In short, there is no problem of causation because the issue rests
on having two kinds of substance and idealism only has one. Berkeley’s idealism also retains the
explanatory power of the ‘two things’ of dualism. Within idealism, there are minds and ideas
OHK.

Only mind is a substance, but for reasons already discussed at length, we retain a second

sort of existing stuff. As such, idealism keeps the ability to speak of two kinds of existing things,
putting it in the unique position of at once claiming dualism’s explanatory power and the
monistic ability to disband the problem of causality.
Monistic issues that idealism resolves…

One further difficulty for monisms is their need to separates themselves one from the
next. Each is claiming that there is only one substance, so no immediate distinction appears
between, say, idealism and physicalism. As explored in, “Two Outstanding Questions,” Berkeley
must define ‘mind’ carefully so as to avoid crafting arguments that could just as well support the
case of material substance. Berkeley’s is not the only monism to need clarity on account of
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definitions. We will presently address physicalism since, at this point in time, it is the most
widely held monism in philosophy of mind.149
Howell makes note of a serious problem of definition for physicalism in his
Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism. In Chapter II:
“The Base Problem,” he directly confronts the difficulty of defining the physical. This problem is
especially grave because without a proper definition of the physical, physicalism cannot hope to
get off the ground. Howell identifies four problems which make it rather difficult to arrive at a
satisfactory definition.
The first problem is that you cannot define the physical simply by saying that it is not
mental.150 This does not define the physical – nor does it define the mental which the physical is
not. “It would be far preferable,” writes Howell, “to have a definition that said what physical
properties are, rather than what they are not – is there really a unified nature shared by all things
not mental, unlike the nature shared by things that are not cucumbers?”151 The second problem is
that you cannot define the physical by saying that it is the kind of stuff discovered by X
method.152 This would put us in the troubling position deciding whether what was discovered by
the methods of Galileo or the methods of Einstein is really physical – obviously, we would like
to say that they both discovered something physical. The third problem is that you cannot define
the physical by saying that it is like collection X.153 Howell remarks, “One might be inclined to
say that things are physical if they are sufficiently similar to ‘that stuff’ where a sufficiently
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comprehensive sample of dirt, tables, chairs, and unequivocally physical things are
demonstrated.”154 The issue is that “the fundamental physical properties of the universe probably
bear little salient resemblance to paradigmatic physical objects. A quark is not much like a
chair.”155 So, we would again have to decide whether one group (fundamental physical
properties) or another (paradigmatic physical objects) is physical – and, obviously, we would
like to say that they both are. Finally, the fourth problem is that you cannot define the physical
by saying that it is the stuff or type of stuff studied by physics.156 Howell clarifies that in this
case “Either the definition proceeds in terms of what is countenanced by current physics or it
proceeds in terms of what would be acknowledged by some future, perhaps completed physics. If
the former, physicalism is surely false since current physics is almost certainly incomplete. If the
latter, however, it is hard to give content to the notion since no one knows what a future physics
will look like.”157
These are not small problems. How, if one cannot define the physical, is it appropriate to
claim that the universe is physical? This seems a hollow argument indeed. Descartes first
encountered this problem when he defined to be material as “to be extended in space.”158 Howell
comments, “The Cartesian definition of the physical failed in part because the progress of the
physical sciences led us to see that very strange things, such as electrons, quarks, and fields,
make up the physical world.”159 Just as for Descartes, so for today’s physicalism: the problem of
defining the physical remains.
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So, what does this say to the viability of idealism? Does idealism have a similar issue or
set of issues, being itself a monism? Referencing the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology,” it
is fair to claim that idealism is clearer in its definitions of idea and of mind that physicalism is in
its definition of physical. It is given, then, that idealism holds at least an equally viable position
as physicalism. Although there is not space to properly make this argument, idealism’s ability to
define its fundamentals in contrast to physicalism’s (at least seeming) inability indicates that
idealism may even achieve a higher place yet than its monistic competitor.160

BRIEF CONCLUDING WORD
Idealism, of course, comes with its own set of issues. Over the years, Berkeley’s idealism
has been refashioned by many other philosophers. Some of these idealisms have so far diverged
from Berkeley that they merit names besides Berkeleyan idealism. Among these, we find
mereological idealism, causal idealism, and conceptual idealism.161, 162, 163 It also bears
mentioning that scholarship on idealism is not limited to Berkeley. There are significant strains
of idealism in Jewish thought and in Buddhist thought, to name two alternate sources. Even
within the Berkeleyan tradition of idealism, there are philosophers branching into realms that
Berkeley would never have touched. Hellen Yetter-Chappell, for example, writes an article
entitled, “Idealism Without God.”164 This paper has not sustained any real discussion of the
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importance of God in Berkeleyan idealism but suffice to say: God is of fundamental importance
to Berkeley’s idealism. One of the chief impetuses for Berkeley’s idealism is that it allows him
to argue for a universe that depends intricately and constantly on God for its existence and
operation.165 That there could be an idealism without God represents just how far scholarship on
idealism has branched from Berkeley’s own philosophy.
In any case, I believe it is clear that on investigation, idealism is a strong philosophical
contender in today’s world, especially in the philosophy of mind and self. I recognize that this
paper only touches the surfaces of many deep and difficult subjects. It would be false to pretend
that we have discussed even the first quarter of any of the subjects approached, and it bears
mentioning that idealism has many features that have not gotten even the slightest treatment. The
role of God in Berkeleyan idealism, for example, and Berkeley’s philosophy of vision are two
important pieces of his philosophy that have fallen by the wayside for reasons of length. By
housing the discussion within Berkeley’s Principles, we have regardless made an excellent foray
into the heart of his philosophy. To conclude without bedraggling the issue: Berkeley’s idealism
shows itself to be far from dead and a worthy philosophy in many fields, notably the philosophy
of mind. The great gadfly of 18th century philosophy remains today as adept a philosopher as
ever and merits the attention of all who read him.
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